MYTHS VS. FACTS
Automated License Plate
Recognition (ALPR) Technology
(Why SB 893 is Bad Policy)
MYTH:
Law enforcement agencies (LEAs) and private companies have no legitimate
use of ALPR data.
Ø FACT: ALPR is used routinely by LEAs and the private
sector to rescue abducted children, catch murderers, robbers, and drug dealers,
find missing elderly adults, recover stolen vehicles, repossess cars whose
drivers have broken contracts with lending institutions, and investigate
insurance fraud. ALPR technology provides for increased police efficiency,
higher productivity, and creates a greater deterrent to those committing
crimes.
MYTH:
Collecting license plate data is an intrusion of your privacy and ALPR
databases contain personally identifiable information about vehicle owners.
Ø FACT: There is no law that provides an
expectation of privacy in a license plate. To the contrary, license plates are
legally required to be mounted and publicly visible on vehicles at all times.
ALPR technology takes a picture of a license plate and ONLY includes, the
license plat number, date, time, and location information. It does not contain
any personally identifiable information at all. ALPR databases are nothing but
a collection of these pictures and standard computer industry best security
practices are used to protect them.
MYTH:
Law enforcement agencies (LEAs) and private companies have no legitimate
use of ALPR data.
Ø FACT: ALPR is used routinely by LEAs and the private
sector to rescue abducted children, catch murderers, robbers, and drug dealers,
find missing elderly adults, recover stolen vehicles, repossess cars whose
drivers have broken contracts with lending institutions, and investigate
insurance fraud. ALPR technology provides for increased police efficiency, higher
productivity, and creates a greater deterrent to those committing crimes.
MYTH:
Proposed laws, such as SB 893, that limit access to ALPR data, provide
reasonable guidelines on the use of this technology, and will protect your
personal privacy.
Ø FACT: Limiting access to ALPR data DOES
NOT protect personal privacy. A license
plate only contains numbers and letters – not personally identifiable
information. The license plate reader does not, and cannot, identify the owner
or driver of the vehicle. SB 893 would impede law enforcement’s ability to use
this technology to solve crimes and to protect California communities.
MYTH:
LPR technology is not that important to LEAs and they could solve crimes
and get along just fine without the use of ALPR data.
Ø FACT: ALPR
technology is one of the most powerful crime-fighting tools available to law
enforcement. It’s truly a force multiplier for both street officers and
investigators. Most crimes have a vehicle nexus and LPR is the best tool to
quickly solve these offenses and cut the crime rate in California.
Ø FACT: Misuse of ALPR data is almost
unknown. However, there are hundreds of great
examples of the technology solving very serious crimes in California that might
not have been resolved otherwise. ALPR critics, like chicken little, run around
telling their version of “the sky is falling.” ALPR works and law enforcement
should not shy away from this powerful tool.
MYTH:
ALPR is an out-of-control, unregulated governmental
intrusion into the private lives of ordinary citizens.
Ø FACT: ALPR
systems don’t really work that way. They do not track “ordinary citizens.” An
individual vehicle will only come to the attention of law enforcement in one or
both of two situations: 1) If the vehicle is on a “hot list” (e.g. stolen or
felony stop) at the time the license plate is initially read, or 2) when a
query is made as a result of a criminal investigation and a vehicle or vehicles
are identified as meriting follow-up. Despite wild accusations by groups such
as the ACLU, ALPR records are not personally identifying information; ALPR
cameras capture images of a vehicle and its plate, not the person who is
operating it.
MYTH: ALPR is used like a GPS system that tracks every move a
vehicle makes.
Ø FACT: ALPR records are intermittent captures of encounters with
vehicles and don’t come close to the full-time tracking of GPS devices. The
vehicle’s registered owner is unknown to law enforcement without a separate
query of a secure database that leaves an audit trail.
MYTH: ALPR data can easily be abused by LEAs to produce
politically embarrassing information that can be used to hurt or discredit
ordinary law-abiding citizens and pry into their lives; ALPR historical
databases are ripe for abuse like racial profiling and stalking.
Ø FACT: ALPR critics have rarely ever produced a case of an ALPR
database being used for nefarious purposes; if it does happen, those who misuse
databases can be held accountable, fired and prosecuted for any crime that
might have been committed. The reality: other databases routinely used
by LEAs have much more intrusive and private information than the typical ALPR
system. For instance, a simple driver’s license check tells what a person
weighs, their natural hair color, when they were born, where they live and what
their driving infractions have been.
Ø SB 893 would limit California law enforcement agencies ability to use ALPR
data thus removing a tool from their tool box and making it harder to keep our
communities safe.